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In	  October	  2012,	  Par	  Engstrom	  and	  Andrei	  Gomez-­‐Suarez	  organised	  a	  roundtable	  
discussion	  on	  the	  Colombian	  peace	  process	  at	  the	  UCL	  Institute	  of	  the	  Americas.1	  
Since	  then,	  a	  series	  of	  similar	  events	  have	  continued	  the	  discussions	  through	  the	  
year.	  I	  see	  a	  growing	  consensus	  among	  attendees	  that	  I	  have	  talked	  to	  that	  the	  talks	  
in	  Havana	  will	  culminate	  in	  a	  signed	  agreement	  between	  the	  Colombian	  government	  
and	  FARC.	  	  The	  positive	  enthusiasm	  at	  these	  events	  contrasts	  with	  the	  slow	  process	  
in	  Havana	  in	  which	  no	  substantial	  details	  have	  emerged	  and	  nothing	  will	  be	  agreed	  
until	  everything	  is	  agreed.	  
	  
In	  the	  midst	  of	  this	  UK-­‐based	  activity,	  the	  Colombian	  state,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  
Ambassador,	  consular	  staff	  and	  occasional	  political	  allies,	  has	  sought	  to	  engage	  first	  
hand	  in	  the	  discussions.	  Their	  attendance	  is	  augmented	  by	  a	  highly	  approachable	  
and	  consultative	  approach	  whereby	  these	  representatives	  of	  the	  Colombian	  state	  
will,	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  talk	  to	  anyone	  attending.	  I	  personally	  believe	  that	  
this	  approach	  is	  a	  different	  way	  of	  doing	  politics	  than	  most	  people	  are	  used	  to	  from	  
the	  Colombian	  Government	  and	  that	  it	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  move	  from	  elitist	  towards	  
more	  democratic	  political	  change.	  	  My	  observation	  is	  that	  they	  want	  the	  debates	  and	  
discussions	  to	  take	  place,	  and	  they	  want	  to	  explain	  the	  policies	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  government	  and	  to	  encourage	  participation	  of	  all	  those	  with	  an	  interest	  
to	  participate	  in	  changing	  Colombia	  for	  the	  better.	  	  	  
	  
Of	  course	  by	  being	  approachable	  and	  by	  seeking	  opinion	  they	  are	  also	  putting	  
themselves	  in	  the	  line	  of	  criticisms	  that	  would	  never	  have	  come	  if	  they	  had	  
maintained	  a	  distance	  and	  shown	  no	  interest	  in	  what	  anyone	  thought.	  My	  
commentary	  will	  shortly	  exploit	  this	  very	  weakness,	  but	  before	  I	  do	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  
make	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  critique	  is	  not	  looking	  at	  individual	  political	  motives	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  
repeat	  of	  the	  mantra	  of	  a	  criminal	  Colombian	  state.	  Instead	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  see	  an	  
emergent	  discourse	  within	  the	  new	  consultative	  approach.	  
	  
I,	  like	  many	  other	  people	  following	  these	  debates	  through	  the	  polite	  ambiance	  of	  
governmental,	  academic	  and	  institutional	  forums	  of	  the	  South-­‐East	  of	  England,	  am	  
beginning	  to	  form	  an	  opinion,	  not	  just	  about	  the	  progress	  in	  the	  peace	  talks	  but	  
essentially	  about	  the	  current	  Colombian	  administration	  too.	  	  Personally,	  I	  am	  finding	  
that	  my	  critical	  capacity	  (which	  often	  is	  in	  overdrive)	  is	  being	  replaced	  by	  the	  belief	  
that	  the	  government	  has	  the	  intellectual	  and	  political	  capacity	  to	  bring	  a	  peace	  deal	  
to	  the	  Colombian	  people	  that	  will	  not	  only	  bring	  to	  the	  end	  60	  years	  of	  conflict	  but	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also	  transform	  the	  Colombian	  state	  into	  a	  far	  less	  corrupt	  and	  more	  socially	  benign	  
authority.	  Note	  my	  position,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  Santos	  administration,	  not	  FARC,	  nor	  
any	  other	  body,	  can	  bring	  the	  peace	  deal.	  	  As	  I	  have	  got	  to	  know	  the	  protrusions	  of	  
that	  state	  that	  interact	  with	  me,	  I	  am	  growing	  to	  trust	  them.	  	  	  
	  
What	  stands	  out	  in	  all	  the	  talking	  about	  ‘the	  talks’	  is	  that	  the	  identifiable	  and	  
transparent	  presence	  of	  the	  Colombian	  state	  is	  not	  paralleled	  by	  an	  identifiable	  and	  
transparent	  representation	  of	  FARC;	  unlike	  Sinn	  Fein	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,	  there	  is	  no	  
political	  wing	  here	  engaged	  with	  us	  chattering	  classes.	  	  While	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
Santos	  administration	  is	  accessible	  and,	  at	  times,	  professionally	  presented,	  there	  is	  
no	  similar	  communication	  with	  FARC.	  Their	  proscription	  forms	  a	  shadow	  that	  follows	  
our	  chatter	  silently	  around	  the	  room;	  FARC	  cannot	  be	  present,	  they	  remain	  outlaws.	  
	  
There	  is	  occasionally	  the	  surreptitious	  presence	  of	  certain	  refugees.	  Here,	  those	  in	  
the	  know	  of	  particular	  complex	  Colombian	  histories	  might	  suspect	  (or	  be	  silently	  
certain)	  that	  specific	  people	  in	  the	  room	  are	  closer	  to	  the	  FARC	  or	  another	  leftist	  
organisation	  than	  is	  transparently	  clear.	  	  Such	  it	  is	  that	  that	  we	  find	  ourselves	  
immersed	  in	  insinuation	  and	  gossip,	  pointing	  a	  finger	  of	  political	  association,	  which	  
in	  these	  times	  of	  liminality,	  translates	  into	  their	  past	  or	  future	  guilt,	  heroism	  or	  
danger.	  As	  we	  try	  to	  analyse	  what	  is	  happening	  we	  repeat	  the	  very	  format	  that	  led	  to	  
the	  presence	  of	  so	  many	  Colombian	  refugees	  in	  London	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Once	  again	  
the	  consequences	  of	  political	  outlaws	  is	  that	  their	  views	  cannot	  be	  as	  openly	  
expressed	  as	  those	  of	  the	  Colombian	  state.	  
	  
Our	  talks	  about	  ‘the	  talks’	  are	  therefore	  refracted	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  true	  debate	  and	  
the	  remnants	  of	  solipsism.	  	  The	  performance	  of	  transparency	  by	  agents	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  government	  is	  but	  one	  side	  of	  the	  coin,	  on	  the	  other	  side	  are	  the	  more	  
concealed	  and	  disguised	  performances	  by	  all	  interested	  parties,	  including	  the	  
Colombian	  government.	  
	  
The	  distribution	  of	  power,	  between	  FARC	  and	  the	  Santos	  administration,	  in	  courting	  
the	  opinion	  of	  international	  government,	  media,	  academics,	  business,	  security	  
analysts,	  NGOs	  and	  so	  on	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  events	  in	  the	  last	  week	  of	  September	  
2013.	  When	  the	  Reverend	  Jesse	  Jackson,	  a	  US	  civil	  rights	  leader	  and	  Democrat,	  
announced	  to	  the	  international	  press	  that	  he	  was	  on	  a	  mission	  to	  release	  US	  hostage	  
Kevin	  Scott	  Sutay,	  I	  initially	  was	  trying	  to	  work	  out	  how	  this	  apparently	  random	  event	  
had	  come	  together.	  The	  news	  revealed	  that	  it	  was	  a	  largely	  pragmatic	  set	  of	  events	  
whereby	  Jackson	  had	  been	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  black	  leaders	  in	  Cartagena	  where	  he	  
offered	  to	  help	  release	  the	  hostage,	  upon	  which	  FARC	  immediately	  invited	  him	  to	  
Cuba.	  Santos	  promptly	  tweeted	  back	  an	  emphatic	  ‘No!’	  and,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  
the	  story	  runs	  on	  with	  Jackson	  saying	  he	  is	  going	  to	  help	  anyway.	  	  Behind	  those	  
events	  lies	  another	  story.	  
	  
For	  most	  of	  his	  life	  the	  Reverend	  Jesse	  Jackson	  has	  had	  a	  magnetic	  attraction	  
towards	  cases	  of	  injustice	  and	  an	  equally	  strong	  pull	  towards	  the	  media.	  The	  FARC-­‐
Jackson	  event	  brought	  significant	  international	  press	  coverage,	  more	  importantly	  it	  
hooked	  the	  US	  networks	  too.	  	  Jackson	  had	  a	  cause	  to	  relieve	  suffering	  somewhere	  in	  
the	  world	  accompanied	  by	  the	  media	  attention	  that,	  like	  many	  others,	  he	  relishes.	  
Meanwhile	  FARC,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  talks	  began,	  had	  some	  celebrity	  
coverage.	  	  If	  Jesse	  Jackson	  was	  talking	  to	  the	  “leftists”	  (as	  much	  US	  media	  labelled	  
FARC)	  then	  he	  was	  also	  beginning	  to	  legitimise	  them	  as	  something	  other	  than	  a	  
terrorist	  organisation.	  Moreover,	  Jackson	  was	  not	  demanding	  that	  FARC	  release	  the	  
US	  hostage,	  instead	  he	  was	  working	  with	  them	  to	  help	  the	  release.	  Jackson	  took	  the	  
message	  to	  the	  US	  population	  that	  FARC	  did	  not	  want	  to	  keep	  US	  citizens	  captive.	  
The	  message	  stood	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Santos	  administration	  that	  had	  a	  far	  more	  
circumspect	  approach	  to	  the	  issue;	  for	  the	  Santos	  administration,	  beyond	  the	  
announcements	  of	  clear	  government	  lines	  of	  practice	  being	  drawn,	  dealing	  with	  
FARC	  remained	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  closed-­‐door	  politics.	  	  
	  
At	  about	  the	  same	  time	  Alejandro	  Eder,	  the	  director	  for	  the	  Colombian	  Agency	  for	  
Reintegration,	  met	  the	  Pope	  (President	  Santos	  had	  also	  met	  His	  Holiness	  only	  a	  
couple	  of	  weeks	  earlier),	  presenting	  the	  pontiff	  with	  a	  Colombian	  football	  shirt	  
signed	  by	  none	  other	  than	  the	  great,	  and	  internationally	  recognised,	  Valderrama.	  	  
That	  week,	  in	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  brigadas	  for	  an	  international	  platform,	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  sided	  with	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  FARC	  grabbed	  an	  Afro-­‐
American	  civil	  rights	  campaigner	  (possibly	  creating	  	  the	  first	  prime	  time	  appearance	  
of	  an	  Afro	  leader	  at	  the	  Havana	  talks).	  	  	  
	  
The	  lines	  between	  power	  and	  resistance,	  the	  haves	  and	  have-­‐nots,	  the	  Nation	  and	  
the	  civilian,	  empowered	  and	  marginalised,	  were	  clearly	  demarcated	  in	  the	  
independent	  international	  performances	  of	  the	  Santos	  administration	  and	  FARC.	  The	  
Colombian	  government	  was	  following	  established	  norms	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  
and	  FARC	  were	  left	  with	  a	  very	  different	  engagement	  with	  international	  
commentators	  and	  analysts	  –	  the	  Pope	  had	  not	  invited	  FARC	  to	  the	  Vatican	  to	  
present	  him	  with	  the	  football	  shirt	  of	  the	  nation,	  and	  Santos	  had	  not	  resorted	  to	  a	  
moment	  of	  media	  opportunity	  by	  showcasing	  Jesse	  Jackson	  alongside	  his	  political	  
agenda.	  Like	  the	  talks	  in	  London,	  the	  international	  establishment	  was	  predominantly	  
being	  courted	  by	  just	  one	  party	  of	  the	  negotiating	  table,	  with	  the	  other	  party	  
manoeuvring	  for	  space	  on	  the	  sidelines.	  As	  if	  to	  emphasise	  how	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
public	  engagement	  had	  not	  changed	  between	  the	  two	  sides,	  FARC’s	  entry	  into	  the	  
media	  spotlight	  was	  through	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  armed	  kidnapping	  and	  the	  
government	  through	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  state	  protocols.	  	  
	  
So	  while	  it	  is	  a	  positive	  and	  worthwhile	  initiative	  for	  the	  Colombian	  government	  in	  
the	  UK	  to	  meet	  with	  people,	  regardless	  of	  public	  stature	  or	  influence,	  as	  one	  of	  those	  
people	  I	  would	  welcome	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  whereby	  
representatives	  of	  FARC	  could	  be	  officially	  invited	  to	  these	  meetings	  as	  well,	  not	  just	  
to	  give	  a	  speech	  but	  to	  mix	  with	  and	  listen	  to	  those	  attendees,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
public	  stature	  or	  influence.	  	  Both	  sides	  of	  this	  bloody	  conflict	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
openly	  demonstrate	  their	  humility	  and	  willingness	  to	  participate	  in	  wider	  debate.	  
	  
Without	  such	  a	  measure,	  and	  with	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  largely	  one-­‐sided	  public	  
consultation/public	  relations	  exercise	  there	  are	  two	  interrelated	  consequences.	  	  
Firstly,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  illegality	  of	  FARC	  prevents	  the	  organisation	  from	  being	  
able	  to	  engage	  in	  similar	  public	  interactions.	  If	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  is	  that	  conflict	  is	  better	  dealt	  with	  through	  debate	  and	  democratic	  
politics	  than	  through	  resort	  to	  violence	  then,	  given	  that	  FARC	  currently	  has	  no	  
recognised	  political	  representatives	  who	  can	  legally	  take	  part	  in	  such	  public	  
discussions,	  how	  are	  they	  going	  to	  begin?	  One	  factor	  guiding	  the	  Northern	  Ireland	  
peace	  process	  was	  that	  Sinn	  Fein	  and	  the	  Unionists	  had	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  
public	  opinion	  because	  of	  years	  of	  interacting	  with	  the	  public	  through	  consultation	  
and	  public	  relations;	  FARC	  do	  not	  have	  such	  legally	  established	  mechanisms.	  Gerry	  
Adams	  could	  visit	  the	  White	  House	  prior	  to	  the	  agreement	  being	  signed;	  can	  FARC	  
representatives	  do	  the	  same?	  
	  
The	  second	  consequence	  is	  possibly	  more	  disturbing.	  	  As	  the	  Colombian	  government	  
attends	  successive	  meetings,	  consultations	  and	  inter-­‐state	  forums	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  
the	  world	  they	  are	  simultaneously	  promoting	  their	  own	  political	  initiatives.	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  scandals	  over	  parapolitics	  and	  the	  killing	  of	  trade	  unionists	  that	  impaired	  
previous	  administrations	  relations	  with	  US	  Congress	  and	  Europe,	  the	  current	  
administration	  have	  an	  air	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  International	  Community	  that	  has	  
evaded	  many	  predecessors.	  	  They	  are	  counselling	  a	  particularly	  wide	  range	  of	  
opinion,	  while	  demonstrating	  that	  they	  are	  a	  responsible	  government	  that	  is	  trying	  
to	  find	  the	  best	  means	  possible	  to	  end	  the	  conflict.	  As	  I	  said	  before,	  the	  presentation	  
we	  get	  is	  that	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  bring	  FARC	  to	  an	  agreement,	  not	  that	  two	  parties	  are	  
negotiating.	  	  In	  these	  circumstances	  if	  an	  agreement	  is	  not	  reached	  then	  FARC	  will	  
have	  shown	  itself	  to	  be	  unwilling	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  type	  of	  democratic	  debate	  that	  
the	  current	  government	  has	  taken	  great	  efforts	  to	  promote.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  a	  further	  continual	  theme	  coming	  from	  the	  Colombian	  government	  is	  the	  
extent	  of	  criminality	  within	  FARC.2	  Here	  the	  government	  either	  ignores	  corruption	  
and	  criminality	  within	  its	  own	  institutions	  or	  at	  best	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  successfully	  
containing	  these	  problems	  while	  promoting	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  high	  ratio	  of	  criminal,	  
rather	  than	  political,	  actors,	  within	  FARC.	  FARC	  members	  remain	  an	  isolated	  force	  in	  
the	  jungle	  unaccustomed	  to	  civilised	  society,	  illiterate	  and	  socially	  immature,	  and	  
they	  face	  upon	  demobilisation	  either	  a	  difficult	  journey	  of	  reformation	  or	  the	  more	  
tempting	  option	  of	  high	  earning	  criminality.	  A	  major	  challenge	  of	  the	  peace	  process,	  
that	  the	  government	  presents	  us	  with	  is	  not	  moving	  FARC	  away	  from	  violent	  politics,	  
instead	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  drawing	  these	  combatants	  away	  from	  violent	  criminality.	  
	  
The	  line	  between	  the	  criminal	  and	  the	  political	  is	  being	  drawn	  and	  will	  be	  the	  post-­‐
Havana	  standard	  by	  which	  politics	  and	  violence	  is	  dealt	  with.	  	  In	  such	  a	  scenario,	  if	  
FARC	  do	  not	  sign	  an	  agreement	  then	  they	  will	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  their	  criminal	  
interests	  exceed	  their	  ideological	  agenda	  –	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  carry	  on	  with	  armed	  
action	  will	  be	  deemed	  criminals	  rather	  than	  political	  guerrillas.	  	  If	  FARC	  do	  sign,	  
whoever	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  agreement	  once	  again	  becomes	  criminalised.	  	  
Some	  might	  object	  to	  this	  formula,	  but	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  international	  community	  
who	  have	  for	  the	  past	  year	  been	  courted	  by	  the	  democratic	  aspirations	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  government,	  and	  have	  already	  been	  informed	  about	  the	  problems	  of	  
                                            
2	  See	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐latin-­‐america-­‐24331741	  (accessed	  3rd	  Oct	  2013)	  
criminality	  within	  FARC,	  the	  formula	  makes	  sense.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  recent	  protests	  
in	  Colombia	  the	  government	  made	  it	  very	  clear	  that	  they	  would	  not	  tolerate	  violence	  
(by	  the	  protestors	  or	  anyone	  associated	  with	  the	  protest).	  	  The	  line	  was	  drawn	  
between	  political	  actions	  and	  violent	  actions;	  violence	  was	  deemed	  criminal	  not	  
political.	  	  
	  
We	  are	  moving	  from	  a	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  to	  a	  ‘war	  on	  crime’,	  where	  the	  political	  can	  be	  
easily	  criminalised.	  	  This	  might	  be	  a	  positive	  step	  forward,	  Colombia	  moves	  from	  a	  
small	  war	  scenario	  to	  the	  state	  regaining	  the	  absolute	  legitimacy	  of	  force	  within	  its	  
borders.	  However,	  with	  the	  international	  community	  seduced	  by	  Santos’	  enthusiasts	  
of	  democratic	  freedoms,	  those	  areas	  within	  Colombia	  that	  are	  defined	  as	  under	  
criminal	  control	  could	  see	  as	  much	  military	  force	  as	  necessary	  used	  to	  ‘liberate’	  the	  
citizens	  without	  fear	  of	  international	  interference.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  like	  Sri	  Lanka,	  
citizen	  casualties	  all	  disappear	  in	  a	  well-­‐conducted	  news	  conference.	  
	  
As	  I	  said	  earlier,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  criminal	  state	  or	  
that	  the	  participation	  in	  debate	  and	  consultation	  by	  government	  representatives	  has	  
a	  sinister	  motive.	  What	  I	  do	  believe	  is	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  current	  manner	  
of	  political	  interaction	  means	  that	  FARC	  remain	  isolated	  and	  that	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  is	  gaining	  more	  credibility	  and	  trust	  than	  is	  safe	  for	  the	  state	  that	  has	  
not	  got	  an	  established	  history	  of	  respecting	  human	  rights.	  	  
	  
Therefore	  I	  ask	  in	  this	  blog	  that	  the	  Colombian	  government	  publically	  announce	  the	  
limits	  of	  force	  that	  they	  will	  use	  in	  order	  to	  tackle	  the	  expected	  criminality	  in	  
locations	  with	  residual	  combatants.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  statement	  condemning	  the	  
strategy	  of	  the	  Sri	  Lankan	  government,	  as	  they	  cleansed	  areas	  occupied	  by	  remaining	  
Tamil	  Tigers,	  would	  be	  an	  effect	  way	  of	  signalling	  the	  less	  barbaric	  intentions	  of	  the	  
Colombian	  government.	  Additionally	  I	  ask,	  as	  the	  lines	  between	  violent	  criminality	  
and	  politics	  are	  inscribed	  deeper	  into	  the	  social	  change	  agenda	  (against	  a	  
background	  of	  increasingly	  legitimate	  state	  force),	  how	  will	  the	  Colombian	  
government	  differentiate	  the	  violently	  political	  (which	  affects	  all	  democracies)	  from	  
the	  violently	  criminal?	  	  
	  
Finally,	  I	  would	  very	  much	  like	  the	  Colombian	  government	  to	  keep	  talking	  to	  
everyone,	  in	  fact	  please	  extend	  the	  exercise,	  but	  please	  let	  the	  less	  than	  legal	  sides	  
participate	  with	  this	  approach	  too;	  stop	  interfering	  with	  debate	  by	  confining	  them	  to	  
the	  margins	  of	  the	  jungle.	  	  Can	  we	  expand	  the	  guest	  lists	  so	  that	  we	  can	  share	  the	  
wine	  and	  canapés	  with	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  Colombian	  political	  opinion	  and,	  
moreover,	  with	  a	  more	  openly	  representative	  reflection	  of	  ‘the	  talks’?	  	  
	  
